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Case No. 20070559-SC
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

BUSHCO, d.b.a. Babydolls Escorts, VALLEY RECREATION, INC., d.b.a. Kitty's
Escort and Angel's Escort, THE D. HOUSE, L.L.C., d.b.a. The Doll House,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
AMERICAN BUSH, INC. and DENALI, L.L.C., d.b.a. Southern Exposure,
Plaintiffs/Appellants in Intervention,
v.
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and PAM HENDRICKSON, R. BRUCE
JOHNSON, D'ARCY DIXON PIGNANELLI, and MARC B. JOHNSON, in their
official capacities as members of the Utah State Tax Commission,
Defendants/Appellees.

Appeal from a Final Judgment and Order of the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Honorable Tyrone Medley, Presiding

BRIEF OF APPELLEES

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is taken from the Final Judgment and Order Granting Defendants1
Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment
entered by the Third Judicial District Court on July 3, 2007, ruling Utah's Sexually
Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax constitutional under the First Amendment
(R. 1206-10). Plaintiffs' timely notice of appeal was filed on July 5, 2007 (R. 1225-26).

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) (West 2004) gives this Court jurisdiction over this appeal
as one not within the original appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals.
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
1. The district court correctly concluded that the Sexually Explicit Business and
Escort Service Tax is content-neutral for the purpose of First Amendment analysis. This
issue is preserved in defendants' memorandum supporting summary judgment
(R. 1036-40) and in the court's decision (R. 1207,ffif2-3).
Standard of Review: Under Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment "shall be
rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.1' In
determining the propriety of summary judgment, the court "need review only whether the
trial court erred by applying the governing law and whether a material fact was in
dispute." Holmes Dev., LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, K 21, 48 P.3d 895. The trial court's
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 2003 UT
13,U16,73P.3d325.
2. The district court, declining to apply strict scrutiny, correctly concluded that the
Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax is constitutional under the
intermediate scrutiny test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). This issue
was preserved for review in defendants' memorandum supporting summary judgment

2

(R. 1041-45), and the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants on this basis
(R. 1207-08,H1|3-4).
Standard of Review: A trial court's conclusion that a statute is constitutional
presents a question of law reviewed under a correction-of-error standard. State v. Ross,
2007 UT 89, H 17,

P.3d

, 2007 WL 3225412.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
issues before the Court is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
This action began on June 7, 2004, when the original plaintiffs, entertainment

businesses featuring semi-nude dancing, filed their complaint (R. 1-26). The complaint
alleged that the Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax, Utah Code Ann.
§§ 59-27-101 through -108, violates plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the federal constitution. Itfurther alleged that the tax effects a taking
under unspecified rules, regulations, and statutes. The complaint sought both injunctive
relief and damages. Before defendants answered, plaintiffs amended the complaint
(R. 30-44), naming an escort service as an additional plaintiff, and moved for a
preliminary injunction (R. 27-29); defendants moved to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds,
including failure to exhaust administrative remedies (R. 176-78 (motion); 179-94
(memorandum)). The trial court denied the injunction and granted defendants' motion to
3

dismiss (R. 373 (minute entry); 382-86 (order)), and plaintiffs appealed (R. 374-75
(notice of appeal); 379-81 (amended notice of appeal)). The Utah Court of Appeals
reversed and remanded in a memorandum decision filed on November 18, 2004,
concluding that the facial challenge to the statute's constitutionality under the First
Amendment was a threshold legal issue not amenable to administrative resolution. See
TDM, Inc. v. Tax Comm% 2004 UT App 433, 103 P.3d 190; R. 405-07. This Court
denied defendants' petition for writ of certiorari by order of March 17, 2005 (R. 401).
On remand, plaintiffs filed second (R. 442-54) and third (R. 547-59) amended
complaints, which sought only declaratory and injunctive relief, and moved to file a
fourth amended complaint (R. 572-73), which the trial court denied (R. 735-37). On
August 14, 2006, American Bush, a formerly added and subsequently dismissed plaintiff,
moved for intervention (R. 853-55); Denali, L.L.C. did likewise on September 12, 2006
(R. 961-63). The trial court granted both motions by order of November 28, 2006
(R. 1003-07). Defendants then filed an amended motion for summary judgment on
February 15, 2007 (R. 1053-55 (motion); 1056-76 (memorandum)), which the court
granted in a final judgment and order filed July 3, 2007 (R. 1206-10). This appeal
followed (R. 1225-1226).
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
The Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax was enacted effective July

1, 2004. Before its passage, the Utah Legislature held committee hearings in which the
committee members heard testimony from the bill's sponsor as well as from Kathy Ockey,
4

an employee of the Utah Department of Corrections who had, at the time of the hearing,
dealt with sex offenders for eighteen years; Dr. Larry Fox; and Attorney General Mark
Shurtleff The testimony addressed the secondary effects caused by patronage of sexually
explicit businesses and escort services, which include commission of sexual offenses and
high rates of recidivism among sex offenders (see R. 133-34; 138; 328; 340), and the
need to fund sex offender treatment to prevent future offenses (R. 130-31; 338).
As enacted, the tax does not apply to sexually explicit businesses at which
individuals' genitals, pubic region, and female breast below a point immediately above the
top of the areola are completely and opaquely covered-the same restrictions placed on
premises and events licensed under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. See Utah Code
Ann. § 32A-1-105(30) and (49), -602 (West Supp. 2007) (formerly found at Utah Code
Ann. § 32A-5-107(38)(a) (West 2004)). These restrictions are also similar to the G-string
and pasties requirement in a South Salt Lake ordinance upheld under the First
Amendment by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Heideman v. South Salt Lake City,
165 Fed. Appx. 627, 2006 WL 245160 (10th Cir. 2006) {Heideman II) (Addendum A,
attached), and by this Court under the state constitution in American Bush v. City of South
Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235 (Utah 2006). In fact, plaintiffs provided the trial court copies of
letters advising current plaintiff American Bush and former plaintiff Due South that their
compliance with, respectively, the South Salt Lake ordinance and the Alcoholic Beverage
Control Act rendered the tax inapplicable to them (R. 601-03).

5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Plaintiffs' arguments are premised on a fundamental error: that the statute here at
issue is "directed at nudity that is 'accompanied by expressive activity'[.]" Aplt. Brief at
15 (quoting City of Erie v. Pap's A. M , 529 U.S. 277, 290 (2000) (plurality opinion)).
Plaintiffs offer no support for this assertion, and nothing in the statute refers to expressive
activity; therefore, the statute is content-neutral. Moreover, to the extent that the statute
impacts expressive conduct at all, it is targeted at the negative secondary effects of that
conduct, not at the conduct itself-another form of content neutrality. Thus, the trial court
correctly found the statute content-neutral for purposes of First Amendment analysis.
And because nudity, by itself, is not a form of protected expression, it is not entitled to
First Amendment protection. Any impingement of the statute on plaintiffs' provision of
nude dancing or other forms of nude entertainment passes intermediate scrutiny under
United States v. O'Brien as no greater than necessary to further an important
governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression.
ARGUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
STATUTE IS CONTENT-NEUTRAL FOR PURPOSES OF FIRST
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS.
For purposes of First Amendment analysis, a statute can be content-neutral in two
ways. First, a statute is content-neutral in the classic sense if it is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression. See Heideman v. South Salt Lake City (Heideman 7), 348
F.3d 1182, 1192 (10th Cir. 2003). As the Tenth Circuit Court stated, "a general
6

prohibition on nudity is 'unrelated to the expression of free expression' because such a law
prohibits a class of conduct, the act of appearing nude in public, without reference to any
element of expression." Id.; see also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 289 (plurality opinion)
("Being 'in a state of nudity' is not an inherently expressive condition."). In the second
sense, a statute is content-neutral "if the government's regulatory purpose is not based on
the communicative aspect of the speech." Heideman /, 348 F.3d at 1193. This category
of content neutrality renders regulations on speech "'content-neutral' not because they
apply to conduct on a generally applicable basis without regard to expressive content, but
because the regulatory purpose is unrelated to that content." Id. The Tenth Circuit "has
held that restrictions based on the negative secondary effects of sexually oriented
businesses are 'content-neutral' in this sense." Id. (citing Z.J. Gifts D-2, L.L.C. v. City of
Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1998)). Utah's Sexually Explicit Business and
Escort Service Tax (the SEBES tax) is content-neutral in both senses.
Nothing in the statute refers to any expressive element of speech. The statute, by
its own terms, applies to sexually explicit businesses and escort services. Under the
statute's definitions,
"Sexually explicit business" means a business at which any nude or partially
denuded individual, regardless of whether the nude or partially denuded
individual is an employee of the sexually explicit business or an
independent contractor, performs any service:
(a) personally on the premises of the sexually explicit business;
(b) during at least 30 consecutive or nonconsecutive days within a
calendar year; and
(c) for:
(i) a salary;
7

(ii) a fee;
(iii) a commission;
(iv) hire;
(v) profit; or
(vi) any amount similar to an amount listed in this Subsection
(4)(c).
Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-102(4) (West 2004). By narrowly defining "nude or partially
denuded" as a condition that this Court has already determined, in American Bush, may
be prohibited altogether, the tax on its face does not restrict expression as an element of
conduct to which the tax applies.
The statute defines an escort service as "any person who furnishes or arranges for
an escort to accompany another individual for: (a) companionship; and (b)(i) a salary; (ii)
a fee; (iii) a commission; (iv) hire; (v) profit; or (vi) any amount similar to an amount
listed in this Subsection (2)(b)." Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-102(2) (West 2004). The
language of these definitions contains no reference to any element of expression. Nor
does the language imposing the tax refer to expressive elements of the conduct to which
the tax applies. Under Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-103 (West 2004),
(1) A tax is imposed on a sexually explicit business equal to 10% of
amounts paid to or charged by the sexually explicit business for the
following transactions:
(a) an admission fee;
(b) a user fee;
(c) a retail sale of tangible personal property made within the state;
(d) a sale of:
(i) food and food ingredients as defined in Section 59-12-102;
or
(ii) prepared food as defined in Section 59-12-102;
(e) a sale of a beverage; and
(f) any service.
8

(2)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a tax is imposed on an escort
service equal to 10% of amounts paid or charged by the escort service for
any transaction that involves providing an escort to another individual.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), the tax imposed by Subsection
(2)(a)does not apply to a transaction that is subject to the tax imposed in
Subsection (1).
Because nothing in the statutory language addresses any expressive element of conduct,
the statute is content-neutral in the classic sense. The tax applies to particular commercial
transactions, regardless of the nature of the service being performed: if the sexually
explicit business has on its premises anyone performing any service for compensation in a
nude or partially denuded state, the business is subject to the tax. Likewise, the tax is
imposed on any provider of an escort, without reference to particular details of the
escort's services.
Even if the statute were not devoid of references to expressive conduct, it is still
content-neutral in the second sense because it does not target the communicative aspect of
speech or expressive conduct but instead addresses the secondary effects of any speech or
expressive conduct that falls within its purview. As the record before the district court
reflects, members of the Utah legislature heard testimony from the bill's sponsor and
others about the relationship between sex offender recidivism and the use of the services
to be taxed. As plaintiffs acknowledge in their opening brief, Kathy Ockey, an employee
of the Utah Department of Corrections, testified before the House Revenue and Taxation
Standing Committee about the cause-and-effect relationship between the use of sexually
explicit services and the commission of sex offenses. See Aplt. Brief at 5-6; R. 133-34.

9

She testified that of the sex offenders she had dealt with in the prior eighteen years, about
half had patronized escort services.1 SeeK. 138-39. Her testimony was based in part on a
study by Hanson and Bussiere of recidivism risks in sex offenders that identified
paraphilias, including use of the types of services subject to the SEBES tax, as a major
risk factor. See Aplt. Brief at 5; R. 134. Likewise, before the Senate Revenue and
Taxation Standing Committee, Ms. Ockey testified that "while the majority of the people
who go out to these types of businesses don't become sex offenders, a significant portion
of sex offenders do utilize these types of businesses, over 50%." R. 328. This testimony
established that the purpose of the statute is not to suppress expressive conduct, but to
address the secondary effects of the taxed businesses, commission of sexual offenses and
sex offender recidivism chief among them.
Although plaintiffs assert that "the tax is, by definition, content-based" (Aplt. Brief
at 20), they fail to identify any statutory language addressing expressive conduct that
would remove the statute from the classic definition of content neutrality. Moreover,
while plaintiffs may disagree with the legislature's reliance on the testimony linking use
of the taxed services with secondary effects, including the commission of sex offenses,
they presented no testimony to the district court countering this testimony. Plaintiffs are
in a position similar to the plaintiff in Pap's A.M.: they have "simply asserted that the
!

This testimony provides a basis for taxing the escort services under the statute. As the
Sixth Circuit has held, nude outcall dancing implicates negative secondary effects such as
increased opportunities to engage in prostitution and possible exposure of minors to the activity.
See Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 Fed. Appx. 438, 447, 2002 WL 104778 (6th Cir. 2002)
(Addendum B, attached).
10

[state's] evidentiary proof was lacking. In the absence of any reason to doubt it, the
[state's] expert judgment should be credited." 529 U.S. at 298. Moreover, legislative
bodies "are entitled to rely, in part, on 'appeal to common sense,' rather than 'empirical
data,' at least where there is no 'actual and convincing evidence from plaintiffs to the
contrary.'" Heideman I, 348 F.3d at 1199 (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books,
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 439 (2002)). Having failed to carry their evidentiary burden in
challenging the state's evidence of secondary effects, plaintiffs cannot show error in the
district court's determination that the statute is content-neutral and, as a result, is entitled
to scrutiny under the intermediate O'Brien standard.
II. APPLYING INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY, THE DISTRICT COURT
CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE STATUTE DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT.
It is beyond question that a content-neutral statute is not subject to strict scrutiny,
but is entitled to the intermediate scrutiny of O'Brien. Under O'Brien, a statute or
regulation passes First Amendment scrutiny
»

if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The district court concluded that the SEBES tax fulfilled each
of the O'Brien criteria. An examination of cases construing and applying O'Brien shows
the district court's decision to be correct.

11

A.

Content Neutrality
As discussed in Point I, above, it is well established that restrictions based on

negative secondary effects are content-neutral. See Heideman I, 348 F.3d at 1193; Z.J.
Gifts, 136 F.3d at 686; see also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 294 (plurality opinion)
(concluding that a statute regulating nude conduct, in part to combat negative secondary
effects but not specifically targeting nudity containing an erotic message, is unrelated to
the suppression of expression). Despite plaintiffs' claims to the contrary, plaintiffs did not
provide any expert or other testimony casting doubt on the negative secondary effects
identified by the testimony supporting the legislation in committee hearings. They neither
showed that the testimony fails to support the state's rationale nor furnished evidence
disputing the facts on which the state relied. Consequently, they did not shift the burden
back to the state to supplement the record with additional supporting evidence. See
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 438-39 (plurality opinion). Moreover, in Alameda Books,
the Supreme Court explicitly rejected a requirement that defendants provide empirical
evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of the chosen solution, stating that it has never
demanded "such a showing, certainly not without actual and convincing evidence from
plaintiffs to the contrary." Id. at 439. The court highlighted its "settled position" that
legislative bodies must have a reasonable opportunity to address the negative secondary
effects of protected speech by experimenting with solutions. Id. (citing City ofRenton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (quoting Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 421 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) (plurality opinion)). Having failed to meet their
12

burden of casting the state's rationale in doubt, plaintiffs have no grounds to contend that
the statute targets the suppression of expression.
The statute's content-neutrality is apparent when contrasted with the tax considered
in Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook, 2007 WL 4526527 (111. App. Dec. 21,
2007) (Addendum C, attached), submitted by plaintiffs as supplemental authority. In
Pooh-Bah, the city and county had separate but similar ordinances that placed a tax of
general applicability on amusements, including "sports, theaters, movies, paid television,
circuses, and numerous other forms of entertainment unless specifically exempted." 2007
WL 4526527 at *5. The ordinances were amended to exempt live performances in small
venues holding not more than 750 people. However, the exemption was limited to
performances "'commonly regarded as a part of the fine arts, such as live theater, music,
opera, drama, ballet, modern or traditional dance, and book or poetry readings. The term
does not include such amusements as athletic events, races or performances conducted at
adult entertainment cabarets [as defined by local ordinance]."' Id. at *1 (quoting Chicago
Mum Code § 4-156-01 0 (amended April 21, 1999); Cook County Amusement Tax
Ordinance, § 2 (eff. April 1, 1999)) (alteration in original). The Illinois court concluded
that the ordinances violated the First Amendment because "[o]ne cannot determine
whether the operative criteria of the adult entertainment cabaret exclusions [from the tax
exemption] apply to a particular small venue without considering the content of the small
venue's featured speech or expressive conduct." 2007 WL 4526527 at *6.
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Unlike the tax in Pooh-Bah, there is no evidence of a conflict between a
constitutional provision and the SEBES tax. The tax, on its face, uniformly applies to
commercial transactions on a content-neutral basis; it does not discriminate between
businesses on the basis of expressive conduct. In fact, plaintiffs assert that it is overbroad
because it can be applied to commercial theater productions, nude modeling at art
schools, and ballet performances (see Aplt. Brief at 23-25)—the exact kinds of "fine arts"
performances that were exempted from the amusement tax at issue in Pooh-Bah,
rendering that tax content-based and subject to examination under a strict scrutiny
standard. This distinction renders Pooh-Bah inapposite and of no persuasive value here.
B.

Constitutional Power of the State
Plaintiffs have also failed to show that the statute does not lie within the state's

constitutional power. The state's taxing authority is plenary: "Nothing in this
Constitution may be construed to prevent the Legislature from providing by statute for
taxes other than the property tax and for deductions, exemptions, and offsets from those
other taxes/5 Utah Const, art. XIII, § 4, cl. 1. Neither in their summary judgment
memoranda (R. 738-86 and 804-14) nor in their opening brief have plaintiffs challenged
the SEBES tax on the basis that the state lacked the authority to enact it. Consequently,
any claim that the tax lies outside the state's constitutional power has been waived.
Moreover, this Court has recognized that "[i]n the matter of raising revenue for the
government the court cannot set up its judgment against the Legislative judgment in
determining who shall be required to contribute." Garrett Freight Lines, Inc. v. State Tax
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Comm'n, 103 Utah 390, 135 P.2d 523, 525 (1943). The Garrett court observed that
m

[t]he taxing power of the state is lodged absolutely in the legislature, and, as the

responsibility of enacting laws devolves exclusively upon that branch of the government,
whether the right of taxation has been exercised justly or unjustly, wisely or unwisely, it
is not for the judiciary to inquire.'" Id. (quoting Kimball v. City of Grantsville City. 19
Utah 368, 57 P. 1,5 (1899)). The court further noted that even though the taxing power
may be abused, "[ujnless such laws are in conflict with some constitutional provision,
either expressly or by implication, the courts have no authority to prevent their
execution.m Id. (quoting Kimball, 57 P. at 5).
In short, unless the Court concludes, under the final two prongs of O'Brien, that
the content-neutral SEBES tax does not further an important state interest, or that it
imposes restrictions on First Amendment speech greater than necessary to further the
state's interest, the tax is not unconstitutional and must be upheld as an appropriate
exercise of legislative power.
C.

Government Interest and Incidental Restriction
As to the remaining inquiries—whether the statute furthers an important or

substantial government interest, and whether any incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment rights is no greater than essential to that interest—case law answers them in
the affirmative. The government interest in protecting public safety has repeatedly been
held of sufficient importance to support restrictions on adult entertainment and nudity,
even where the restrictions impact expressive conduct such as nude dancing. And, "since
15

this is a content-neutral restriction, least restrictive means analysis is not required" in
order to establish that the restriction is no greater than essential to that interest. Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. at 301-02 (plurality opinion). Because the statute in this case addresses
the negative secondary effects of adult businesses and nudity on public safety, and
because its incidental impact on expressive conduct is de minimis, it passes First
Amendment scrutiny under O'Brien.
"It has been by now clearly established that reducing the secondary effects
associated with adult businesses is a substantial government interest fthat must be
accorded high respect.'" Daytona Grand, Inc. v. City ofDaytona Beach, 490 F.3d 860,
873-74 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Alameda Books, 535 U.S. at 444 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted in Daytona Grand))', see
also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 297 (plurality opinion) ("The asserted interests of regulating
conduct through a public nudity ban and of combating the harmful secondary effects
associated with nude dancing are undeniably important."); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 569 (1991) (plurality opinion) (upholding public indecency statute as a
function of traditional police power to provide for public health, safety, and morals).
The burden of establishing secondary effects is not high. The plurality opinion in
Pap's A.M. noted that "[o]n this point, O'Brien is especially instructive." Pap's A.M., 529
U.S. at 298. As the opinion observed, the O'Brien court did not require evidence that the
destruction of draft cards would jeopardize the integrity of the Selective Service System,
but nonetheless concluded that the government had a legitimate and substantial interest in
16

preventing and punishing such destruction: "There was no study documenting instances
of draft card mutilation or the actual effect of such mutilation on the Government's
asserted efficiency interests. But the Court permitted Congress to take official notice, as
it were, that draft card destruction would jeopardize the system." Id. at 299. The Pap's
court concluded "that this sort of leeway is appropriate in a case involving conduct"
subject to content-neutral regulation. Id. And the Heideman I court pointed out, "In
Barnes, the three-justice plurality (Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy) sustained a prohibition on public nudity, as applied to nude dancing, on the
basis of the 'substantial government interest in protecting order and morality,' without the
need for any empirical evidence regarding secondary effects." Heideman /, 348 F.3d at
1197 (quoting Barnes, 501 U.S. at 569) (plurality opinion)).
That the SEBES tax is targeted toward ameliorating negative secondary effects is
established by the testimony offered in its support to the legislative committees
considering it. As recounted in Point I, above, that testimony included identification of a
cause-and-effect relationship between sex offender recidivism and the use of the services
subject to the SEBES tax (R. 133-34); anecdotal evidence that approximately half of
convicted sex offenders have patronized escort services (R. 138-39), and that a majority
have utilized sexually explicit businesses (R. 328); and citation to a study identifying
paraphilias, including the use of the kinds of services subject to the tax, as a major risk
factor for the commission of sex offenses (R. 134). The testimony also addressed the
need to generate funding to support sex offender treatment programs for the protection of
17

the public through prevention of future sex offenses (R. 130-33). The testimony
constitutes evidence the legislators "reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem"
they sought to address. City ofRenton, 475 U.S. at 51-52. Especially in light of
plaintiffs' failure to counter it, it is more than sufficient to establish the importance of the
state's interest in protecting the public against the commission of criminal sexual conduct.
Just as precedent supports a conclusion that the statute addresses an important state
interest, it also supports a conclusion that any incidental impact it has on expressive
conduct is no greater than necessary to further that interest. "[T]he requirement of narrow
tailoring is satisfied 'so long as the . . . regulation promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'" Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 412 U.S.
675, 689 (1985) (alteration in original)); see also Daytona Grand, 490 F.3d at 885
(quoting Ward). The only impact claimed by plaintiffs is that the tax places a burden on
their ability to perform nude dancing. However, a sexually explicit business can avoid
ihe tax altogether through the simple expedient of requiring persons performing services
on its premises to completely and opaquely cover the genitals, pubic region, and female
breast below a point immediately above the top of the areola—the same restrictions
contained in an ordinance that passed this Court's scrutiny under the state constitution in
American Bush and that the Tenth Circuit found constitutional under the First
Amendment in Heideman II: "Finally, as to the fourth [O'Brien] prong, the district court
observed, and we agree, that the requirement that dancers wear 'G-strings' and 'pasties' has
18

a de minimis effect on their ability to communicate their message of eroticism."
Heideman II, 165 Fed. Appx. at 633. See also Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. at 301 (plurality
opinion) ("To be sure, requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly
reduce these secondary effects, but O'Brien requires only that the regulation further the
interest in combating such effects."); Barnes, 501 U.S. at 572 (plurality opinion) ("It is
without cavil that the public indecency statute is 'narrowly tailored'; Indiana's requirement
that the dancers wear at least pasties and G-strings is modest, and the bare minimum
necessary to achieve the State's purpose."); Daytona Grand, 490 F.3d at 885 ("it is wellestablished that a nudity ordinance that imposes a minimum requirement of G-strings and
pasties is narrowly tailored under O'Brien").
CONCLUSION
O'Brien provides the correct standard for plaintiffs' challenge to the
constitutionality of the SEBES tax under the First Amendment. As explained above, the
tax meets each of O'Brien's criteria: it is content-neutral, it lies within the state's authority
to enact, it addresses an important state concern, and its restrictions are no greater than
necessary to address that concern. Plaintiffs have not shown that the tax is
unconstitutional as applied to them, let alone unconstitutional on its face. For these
reasons, defendants respectfully request the Court to affirm the judgment of the district
court holding the provisions of the Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Tax
constitutional under the First Amendment.
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STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Defendants request oral argument due to the complex nature of this area of First
Amendment law.
Dated this

day of January, 2008.

Nancy L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
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Heideman v. South Salt Lake City
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This case was not selected for publication in the
Federal Reporter.Please use FIND to look at the
applicable circuit court rule before citing this
opinion. Tenth Circuit Rule 36.3. (FIND CTA10
Rule 36.3.)
United States Court of Appeals,Tenth Circuit.
Fiona M. HEIDEMAN, Mariea M. Berryman;
Crystal Dieringer; Heather R. Liljenquist; and
Jennifer Goff, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Ashleigh Mann; Leah Rae Malcolm; and
American Bush, Plaintiffs-Intervenors-Appellants,
v.
SOUTH SALT LAKE CITY, a Utah Municipal
Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
No. 04-4199.
Feb. 2, 2006.
Background: Former nude dancers and adult
entertainment establishment filed § 1983 action,
challenging on First Amendment grounds city's
enactment of ordinance banning nudity in adult
businesses. The United States District Court for the
District of Utah entered summary judgment in favor
of city. Plaintiffs appealed.
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Stephanie K.
Seymour, Circuit Judge, held that:
(1) plaintiffs failed to present sufficient
evidence to call into question reasonableness of
ordinance and reliability of evidence supporting its
enactment;
(2) city's nudity ban presented restriction on
First Amendment rights that was no greater than
was necessary to further city's stated interest in
decreasing the likelihood of unsanitary conditions,
unlawful sexual activity and sexually fransmitted
diseases; and

(3) city met its burden of proving
reasonableness of its concerns over negative
secondary effects of nudity in adult businesses, as
well as reasonableness of its belief that ordinance
would successfully address those secondary effects.

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Civil Rights 78 €^>1422
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78k 1416 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
78k 1422 k. Other Particular Cases and
Contexts. Most Cited Cases
Former nude dancers and adult entertainment
establishment failed to present sufficient evidence
in § 1983 action to call into question reasonableness
of city's ordinance banning nudity in adult
businesses and reliability of evidence supporting its
enactment; although dancers and establishment
submitted evidence in rebuttal of other negative
secondary effects cited by city in its ordinance, such
as diminished property values and crime, they
presented no evidence whatsoever that nude
conduct did not result in unsanitary conditions,
unlawful sexual conduct, or the transmission of
sexually transmitted diseases. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[2] Constitutional Law 92 <O=>2207
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression
92k2203 Sexually Oriented Businesses;
Adult Businesses or Entertainment
92k2207 k. Nude or Semi-Nude
Dancing. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(3))
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Public Amusement and Entertainment 3 1 5 T € ^
9(2)

U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[5] Constitutional Law 92 C^>2213

315T Public Amusement and Entertainment
315TI In General
315Tk4
Constitutional,
Statutory
and
Regulatory Provisions
315Tk9 Sexually Oriented Entertainment
315Tk9(2) k. Dancing and Other
Performances. Most Cited Cases
City's nudity ban and its accompanying requirement
that dancers wear "G-strings" and "pasties"
presented a restriction on First Amendment rights of
dancers and adult entertainment establishment that
was no greater than was necessary to further city's
stated interest in decreasing the likelihood of
unsanitary conditions, unlawful sexual activity and
sexually
transmitted
diseases.
U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[3] Civil Rights 78 €^1422
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78kl416 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
78k 1422 k. Other Particular Cases and
Contexts. Most Cited Cases
City council member's testimony in § 1983 action,
even if it evidenced impermissible motives in
enactment of ordinance banning nudity in adult
businesses,
was
insufficient
to
overcome
presumption that city's primary aim in enacting
ordinance was not the suppression of disfavored
speech in violation of the First Amendment.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.
[4] Civil Rights 78 €^1414
78 Civil Rights
78III Federal Remedies in General
78k 1408 Admissibility of Evidence
78k 1414 k. Other Particular Cases and
Contexts. Most Cited Cases
Testimony of city's assistant police chief was
irrelevant in § 1983 action to whether ordinance
banning nudity in adult establishments was enacted
with the primary goal of suppressing First
Amendment speech rights, where chief was not
involved in the decision to enact ordinance.

92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression
92k2203 Sexually Oriented Businesses;
Adult Businesses or Entertainment
92k2213 k. Secondary Effects. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(l))
Public Amusement and Entertainment 315T€=^>
9(1)
315T Public Amusement and Entertainment
315TI In General
315Tk4
Constitutional,
Statutory
and
Regulatory Provisions
315Tk9 Sexually Oriented Entertainment
315Tk9(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
City, which enacted ordinance banning nudity in
adult businesses, met its burden of proving
reasonableness of its concerns over negative
secondary effects of nudity in adult businesses, as
well as the reasonableness of its belief that
ordinance would successfully
address those
secondary effects, as was required to withstanding
First Amendment challenge to ordinance. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
*628 Andrew McCullough, McCullough &
Associates, Midvale, UT, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
*629 David M. Carlson, City Attorney, South Salt
Lake, UT, Scott D. Bergthold, Chattanooga, TN,
Kristin A. Vanorman, Strong & Hanni, Salt Lake
City, UT, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before MURPHY, O'BRIEN,
Circuit Judges.
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FN* This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and
collateral
estoppel. The
court
generally disfavors the citation of orders
and judgments; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of
10th Cir. R. 36.3.
STEPHANIE K. SEYMOUR, Circuit
Judge.
**1 Plaintiffs, former nude dancers and an
adult entertainment establishment that employs
some of them, American Bush, Inc., filed this § 1983
action challenging on First Amendment grounds
the enactment by South Salt Lake City ("the City")
of an ordinance banning nudity in adult businesses.
The district court granted the City's motion for
summary judgment. Plaintiffs appeal, and we
affirm.
The factual background of this action was set
forth in a detailed and comprehensive opinion by
this court addressing Plaintiffs' appeal of the district
court's denial of their motion for preliminary
injunction. Heideman v. S. Salt Lake City, 348
F.3d 1182, 1184-87 (10th Cn.2003)(Heideman 1).
Only facts relevant to the present appeal are
included here.
The City permitted nude entertainment at
certain licensed establishments until May 2, 2001,
when it enacted an ordinance which, among other
things, prohibits all nude conduct in adult business
establishments, either by employees or patrons. S.
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, ch. 5.56 (2001) (the "
Ordinance"). This ban on nude conduct applies to
all adult oriented businesses, not only businesses
like Plaintiff American Bush, Inc., which provide
live entertainment. The Ordinance does not
prohibit erotic dancing, but instead requires
employees engaged in erotic dancing to wear "
G-strings" and "pasties."
In assessing the necessity of the nudity ban and
other restrictions set forth in the Ordinance, the City
council reviewed numerous court opinions and
fifty-six
reports
and
studies
from
other
municipalities regarding the negative secondary
effects associated with adult oriented businesses.
© 2008 Thomson/West. No

Aplt.App., vol. I at 76-77, 175-81. Upon review of
these materials, the City Council made the
following factual findings, which are set forth in the
preamble and "purpose and findings" section of the
Ordinance:
(1)
Sexually
oriented
businesses
lend
themselves to ancillary unlawful and unhealthy
activities that are presently uncontrolled by the
operators of the establishments.... (2) Certain
employees of sexually oriented businesses defined
in this ordinance as adult theaters and cabarets
engage in higher incidents of certain types of illicit
sexual behavior than employees of other
establishments.
(3)
Sexual
acts,
including
masturbation, and oral and anal sex, occur at
sexually oriented businesses.... (5) Persons frequent
certain ... sexually oriented businesses for the
purpose of engaging in sex within the premises of
such sexually oriented businesses. (6) Numerous
communicable diseases may be spread by activities
occurring in sexually oriented businesses.... (7)
According to research from the Kaiser Family
Foundation, an estimated 650,000 to 900,000
Americans are infected with HIV. The number of
new HIV infections occurring each year is now
about 41,000. Men and *630 [w]omen of all races
are most likely to be infected by sexual contact. (8)
A total of 1,672 AIDS cases had been reported in
Utah as of January 1, 1999.... (9) The Center for
Disease Control and Prevention estimate that as
many as 1 in 3 people with HIV do not know they
are infected. (10) The number of cases of early ...
syphilis in the United States reported annually has
risen with 33,613 cases reported in 1982 and
45,200 through November of 1990.(11) The
number of cases of gonorrhea in the United States
reported annually remains at a high level, with over
one-half million cases being reported in 1990.(12)
The Surgeon General of the United States in his
report of October 22, 1986, has advised the
American public that AIDS and HIV infection may
be transmitted through sexual contact, ... and from
an infected mother to the newborn. (13) According
to the best scientific evidence, AIDS and HIV
infection, as well as syphilis and gonorrhea, are
principally transmitted by sexual acts. (14)
Sanitary conditions in some sexually oriented
businesses are unhealthy, in part, because the
activities conducted there are unhealthy, and, in
im to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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part, because of the unregulated nature of the
activities and the failure of the owners and the
operators of the facilities to self-regulate those
activities and maintain those facilities. (15)
Numerous studies and reports have determined that
semen is found in the areas of sexually oriented
businesses where persons view 'adult' oriented
films. (16) The [preceding] findings ... raise
substantial governmental concerns.
**2 Id. at 77-79.
Based on these factual
findings, the
Ordinance's preamble states that it is necessary "to
protect and preserve the health, safety, morals and
welfare of the patrons of [adult entertainment
establishments] as well as the citizens of the City"zV/.
at 75, because nude conduct increases the
prevalence of, among other things, unsanitary
conditions, unlawful sexual activities and sexually
transmitted diseases. The Ordinance further states
that "[t]he general welfare, health, morals and
safety of the citizens of the City will be promoted
by the enactment of this Ordinance, "?7/. at 80, which
includes a total ban on nudity in adult entertainment
establishments.
After the Ordinance was enacted, Plaintiffs
filed the present action claiming that the nudity ban
is an illegal infringement of their First Amendment
rights. They sought a preliminary injunction,
which the district court denied. We upheld the
district court's ruling. Heideman I, 348 F.3d at 1200
. After the parties conducted discovery, the City
filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting
among other things that Plaintiffs failed to submit
sufficient evidence to cast doubt on the evidence
relied on by the City in enacting its Ordinance, or
on the reasonableness of the City's reliance on that
evidence. The district court granted the City's
motion.
We review the district court's grant of summary
judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard
it used. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

a judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P.
56(c). When applying this standard, we view the
evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Garrison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935
(10thCir.2005).
In so doing, we affirm the district court's
summary judgment, but on different*631 grounds.
See United States v. Knox, 124 F.3d 1360, 1362
(10th Cir.1997) (citing Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. I,
521 F.2d 465, 472-73 (10th Cir.1975)) (appellate
court will affirm rulings of lower court on any
ground that finds support in record). We agree
with the district court that the City's evidence meets
the "reasonably believed to be relevant" standard
set forth by the Supreme Court in City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52, 106
S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). However, we
disagree with the court's characterization of
Plaintiffs' challenge, namely, that Plaintiffs' action
simply asks the court to re-weigh the City's
evidence de novo and assess the wisdom of the
City's judgment. Rather, we view Plaintiffs' claims
within the evidentiary burden-shifting framework
set out by the Supreme Court in City of Los Angeles
v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 438-39, 122
S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (plurality
opinion), and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S.
277, 297-98, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265
(2000) (plurality opinion). See also Heideman I,
348 F.3d at 1198 (stating that City's "initial burden
to present empirical support for its conclusions
[regarding necessity of ordinance] is minimal, but
that plaintiffs must have an opportunity to present
their own evidence, to which the city is then entitled
to respond"). Under this approach, we examine
whether Plaintiffs' evidence was sufficient to cast
doubt on the City's evidence and its reliance thereon
to support passage of the Ordinance. If so,
Plaintiffs shift the burden of proof back to the City
and foreclose summary judgment. Plaintiffs failed
to clear this evidentiary hurdle.
**3 [1] On appeal, Plaintiffs claim they did
present sufficient evidence to call into question the
reasonableness of the City's Ordinance and the
reliability of the evidence supporting its enactment.
Specifically, Plaintiffs point to testimony from their
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expert witness attacking the validity of studies and
reports from other cities relied upon by the City, as
well as affidavits from neighboring property owners
stating that their properties and businesses have not
been adversely affected by their proximity to
Plaintiff American Bush, Inc.'s establishment.
Aplt.App., vol. I at 172-74, 186-87, 189-90.
Plaintiffs also point to affidavits and testimony from
the owner of American Bush, Inc., stating that his
establishment, for the most part, has complied fully
with existing regulations, and that banning nude
dancing would force it to start serving alcohol in
order to compete with other adult entertainment
businesses providing semi-nude dancing, thereby
increasing, not limiting, the potential for negative
secondary effects. Id. at 138-39, 192-98. We
conclude, however, that this evidence fails to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to the
reasonableness of the City's clear interest in the
diminishment of such secondary negative effects as
unsanitary conditions, unlawful sexual activity, and
the transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.
Simply put, the record does not contain any
evidence to counter the City's concern over
unsanitary conditions or the possibility of public
health concerns associated with unregulated nude
conduct in adult business establishments. Although
Plaintiffs submitted evidence in rebuttal of other
negative secondary effects cited by the City in its
Ordinance, such as diminished property values and
crime, they presented no evidence whatsoever that
nude conduct does not result in unsanitary
conditions, unlawful sexual conduct, or the
transmission of sexually transmitted diseases.FN1
To *632 the contrary, at least one piece of evidence
submitted by Plaintiffs could be read to support the
reasonableness of the City's concerns. In an
affidavit Hallard Cannon, president and chief
executive officer of American Bush, Inc., stated that
in December 1999, two dancer-employees at his
establishment "were cited for violations of the
ordinance prohibiting 'touching while performing.'
"Id. at 196. Regardless of the final outcome of
those citations, Mr. Cannon's statement at the very
least suggests that nude employees were either
simulating masturbation or engaging in physical
contact with patrons. Both of these activities
reasonably could relate to the City's concern over

unsanitary conditions and unlawful sexual activity
and their relationship to sexually transmitted
diseases. Regardless of the ultimate probative
value of this evidence, the reality remains that
Plaintiffs did not submit any evidence showing that
nude conduct does not present the kinds of negative
secondary effects the City seeks to curtail or
eliminate by requiring employees and patrons to
wear some measure of clothing. Accordingly,
Plaintiffs failed to shift the burden of proof from
themselves back to the City.

FN1. In their reply brief, Plaintiffs claim
that at least some of the evidence the City
relied upon in finding that unsanitary
conditions are connected with nude
entertainment
involves
establishments
different from those employing Plaintiffs
and from Plaintiff American Bush, Inc.
Reply. Br. at 4-5. Specifically, Plaintiffs
claim
that
evidence
of unsanitary
conditions and unlawful sexual activity
associated with "peep shows" and video
booths is not probative as to the existence
of unsanitary conditions and unlawful
sexual
activity
at
nude
dancing
establishments.
Plaintiffs,
however,
misunderstand the nature of their burden of
proof. The City is permitted to rely on
evidence of conditions at adult oriented
businesses in general. See City of Erie v.
Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296-97, 120
S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) ("
Because the nude dancing [at plaintiffs
establishment] is of the same character as
the adult entertainment at issue in Renton
[v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41,
106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986),
namely, adult motion pictures], Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., All U.S.
50, 96 S.Ct. 2440, 49 L.Ed.2d 310 (1976)
[same], and California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109, 93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342 (1972)
[erotic dancing], it was reasonable for [the
city] to conclude that such nude dancing
was likely to produce the same secondary
effects."). Plaintiffs' only means of
rebutting this evidence, therefore, is to
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submit evidence showing how and why
their
particular
activities
and/or
establishments do not present similar
concerns. Plaintiffs simply did not do this.
**4 Their failure to present sufficient evidence
countering that proffered by the City compels us to
further conclude that Plaintiffs did not raise any
genuine issues of material fact to preclude the
district court's grant of summary judgment against
it. In Heideman I, we stated that the City's
Ordinance, as a "time, place and manner"
regulation
designed
to ameliorate
negative
secondary effects rather than to suppress speech, is
to be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny pursuant
to the four part test laid out by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88
S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). Under that
test, the City's Ordinance will survive intermediate
scrutiny if it "(1) [is] within the constitutional
power of the government to adopt; (2) further[s] an
important or substantial government interest; which
(3) is unrelated to the suppression of expression;
and (4) [is] no greater restriction of First
Amendment freedom than is essential to furtherance
of the government's purpose." Heideman 1, 348
F.3d at 1197 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs'
evidence is insufficient to raise genuine issues of
material fact under the O'Brien test.
[2][3][4] As we stated in Heideman 7,"[t]here
is no doubt that the Ordinance is within the lawful
powers" of the City to enact. Id. See also Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (a city's "
efforts to protect public health and safety are clearly
*633 within the city's [zoning] powers").
Therefore, the first prong of the O'Brien test is
easily disposed of. As to the third prong, the
Supreme "Court has consistently held that the
control of negative secondary effects, such as those
invoked by [the City], is unrelated to the
suppression of the expression." Heideman I, 348
F.3d at 1200. Hence, Plaintiffs cannot gain ground
on the third prong.FN2 Finally, as to the fourth
prong, the district court observed, and we agree,
that the requirement that dancers wear "G-strings"
and "pasties" has a de minimis effect on their ability
to communicate their message of eroticism.
Aplt.App., vol. Ill at 863 (citing Heideman J, 348

F.3d at 1200). Therefore, the City's nudity ban and
its accompanying requirement that dancers wear "
G-strings" and "pasties" presents a restriction no
greater than is necessary to further the City's stated
interest in decreasing the likelihood of unsanitary
conditions, unlawful sexual activity and sexually
transmitted diseases.

FN2. Plaintiffs assert, to the contrary, that
the purpose of the Ordinance is the
suppression of disfavored speech and that
the amelioration of negative secondary
effects is merely pretext for the City's
impermissible aim. In support of their
argument, Plaintiffs point to the deposition
testimony of one council member and the
City's Assistant Police Chief. Aplt.App.,
vol. Ill at 682-710. The City claims that
transcripts of these depositions were not
submitted to the district court. Indeed, the
confusing nature of Plaintiffs' appendix
makes it difficult to discern what evidence
was, in fact, before the district court. We
need not try to ascertain whether Plaintiffs'
evidence, in fact, was submitted to the
district court because even if it was, it is
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the City's stated
concern over negative secondary effects is
pretext for the aim of suppressing
protected speech. Regarding the council
member's testimony, the Supreme Court
has stated on several occasions that
evidence of the impermissible motives of
one legislator is insufficient to overcome
the presumption that a legislative body's
primary aim in enacting a given piece of
legislation was not the suppression of
disfavored speech. See City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48,
106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986). As
to the testimony of the Assistant Police
Chief, he was not involved in the decision
to enact the Ordinance, and therefore any
motive he may have had, impermissible or
otherwise, is irrelevant to whether the
Ordinance was enacted with the primary
goal of suppressing speech.
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[5] Turning at last to the second prong of
the O'Brien test, namely, whether the City's nudity
ban is necessary to the furtherance of eliminating
negative secondary effects, we reiterate that the City
bears the initial burden of proving the
reasonableness of its concerns over negative
secondary effects as well as the reasonableness of
its belief that the challenged regulation will
successfully address those secondary effects. See
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 664, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994).
As we noted in Heideman I and as the Supreme
Court has held time and again, however, this burden
is not an onerous one. Heideman I, 348 F.3d at
1197-99. The City may rely on "seemingly
pre-packaged studies, as well as the findings of
courts in other cases." Id. at 1197; see also Pap's
A.M., 529 U.S. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 ("in terms of
demonstrating that ... secondary effects pose a
threat, [a] city need not 'conduct new studies or
produce evidence independent of that already
generated by other cities' to demonstrate the
problem of secondary effects, 'so long as whatever
evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed
to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses'
") (quoting Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct.
925)). We agree with the district court that the
City met its initial burden of presenting evidence "
reasonably believed to be relevant." It was the
Plaintiffs' burden then to submit evidence casting
doubt on the reasonableness or *634 relevance of
the City's evidence and the inferences it drew from
that evidence. As we have already stated, Plaintiffs
failed to do this.
**5 In sum, we conclude that Plaintiffs have
not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to any
of the four O'Brien prongs, and therefore the district
court did not err in granting the City's motion for
summary judgment. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
C.A.IO (Utah),2006.
Heideman v. South Salt Lake City
165 Fed.Appx. 627, 2006 WL 245160 (C.A.IO
(Utah))
END OF DOCUMENT
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This case was not selected for publication in the
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look at the applicable circuit court rule before citing
this opinion. Sixth Circuit Rule 28(g). (FIND CTA6
Rule 28.)
United States Court of Appeals,Sixth Circuit.
Greyson CURRENCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
v.
CITY OF CINCINNATI,
Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant.
Nos. 00-3985, 00-4041.

Lower Court of Grounds of Review
170BVIII(D)1 Issues and Questions in
Lower Court
170Bk612 Nature or Subject-Matter of
Issues or Questions
170Bk612.1 k. In General. Most
Cited Cases
Ripeness may be raised for the first time on appeal.
[2] Constitutional Law 92 C^>978

Nude outcall dancer brought action challenging
constitutionality of city's licensing scheme for
sexually-oriented
businesses
under
First
Amendment. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Ohio, Beckwith, J., 2000
WL 1357918, granted summary judgment for city.
Parties cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals held
that: (1) action was ripe for review regardless of
whether dancer had been denied license; (2) dancer
had standing to challenge licensing scheme; (3)
dancer's nude dancing performances constituted
expression protected by First Amendment; (4)
licensing scheme was not unconstitutional prior
restraint; and (5) ordinance's nudity ban was
constitutional under First Amendment.

92 Constitutional Law
92 VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(C) Determination of Constitutional
Questions
92 VI(C)2 Necessity of Determination
92k978 k. Ripeness; Prematurity.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k46(l))
Given relaxed ripeness standards for facial First
Amendment challenges, outcall dancer's action
challenging constitutionality of city's licensing
scheme for sexually-oriented businesses was ripe
for review regardless of whether dancer had been
denied license; injury to dancer was likely to occur,
given ordinance's ban on nudity, which was major
component of dancer's routine, and absence of
inclination on city's part to grant him a license, case
turned on issues of law and thus was ready for
judicial determination, and withholding of judicial
relief could impose hardship on dancer, who faced
direct and immediate dilemma as to how to conduct
his dance routine within boundaries of the law in
light of nudity ban. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.

Affirmed.

[3] Constitutional Law 92 €^>874

Jan. 24, 2002.

West Headnotes
[1] Federal Courts 170B €^>612.1
170B Federal Courts
170B VIII Courts of Appeals
170BVIII(D) Presentation and Reservation in

92 Constitutional Law
92 VI Enforcement of Constitutional Provisions
92VI(A)
Persons
Entitled
to
Raise
Constitutional Questions; Standing
92VI(A)9
Freedom
of
Speech,
Expression, and Press
92k873 Licenses
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92k874 k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 92k42.2(l))
First Amendment injury allegedly suffered by erotic
dancer was within zone of interests regulated by
city
ordinance
concerning
licensing
of
sexually-oriented businesses, which imposed certain
restrictions or duties on dancer, and therefore
dancer's standing to raise constitutional challenge to
ordinance could not be denied on prudential
grounds, notwithstanding city's contention that
judicial restraint was warranted because dancer was
using judiciary to facilitate sale of personal, totally
nude homosexual interactive conduct. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[4] Constitutional Law 92 €^2207
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression
92k2203 Sexually Oriented Businesses;
Adult Businesses or Entertainment
92k2207 k. Nude or Semi-Nude
Dancing. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(3))
Public Amusement and Entertainment 315T€=^
9(2)
315T Public Amusement and Entertainment
315TI In General
315Tk4
Constitutional,
Statutory
and
Regulatory Provisions
315Tk9 Sexually Oriented Entertainment
315Tk9(2) k. Dancing and Other
Performances. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 376k3.50 Theaters and Shows)
Outcall dancer's nude dancing was expressive
activity for pmposes of First Amendment. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 1.
[5] Constitutional Law 92 €^>2207
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression

92k2203 Sexually Oriented Businesses;
Adult Businesses or Entertainment
92k2207 k. Nude or Semi-Nude
Dancing. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(3))
Public Amusement and Entertainment 315T€^>
9(2)
315T Public Amusement and Entertainment
315TI In General
315Tk4
Constitutional,
Statutory
and
Regulatory Provisions
315Tk9 Sexually Oriented Entertainment
315Tk9(2) k. Dancing and Other
Performances. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 376k3.50 Theaters and Shows)
Outcall dancer's nude dancing performances
constituted
expression
protected
by
First
Amendment, notwithstanding city's contention that,
due to private setting in which dancer's
performances occurred, his services were of escort
nature and thus outside First Amendment's
protection. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[6] Constitutional Law 92 €^>2201
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression
92k2201 k. Nude Dancing in General.
Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(3))
Erotic dancing is expression protected by the First
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
[7] Constitutional Law 92 € ^ 2 2 0 8
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression
92k2203 Sexually Oriented Businesses;
Adult Businesses or Entertainment
92k2208 k. Licenses and Permits in
General. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(l))
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Public Amusement and Entertainment 3 1 5 T € ^
9(1)
315T Public Amusement and Entertainment
315TI In General
315Tk4
Constitutional,
Statutory
and
Regulatory Provisions
315Tk9 Sexually Oriented Entertainment
315Tk9(l) k. In General. Most Cited
Cases
(Formerly 376k3 Theaters and Shows)
City's licensing scheme for sexually-oriented
businesses was not unconstitutional prior restraint
on First Amendment expression; ordinance did not
vest unbridled discretion in government officials,
but rather provided for issuance of license if
applicant met objective, specified criteria, decision
to issue license had to be made within specified,
brief period and status quo was maintained during
that time, and scheme provided for prompt judicial
review by requiring issuance of provisional license
pending
judgment
by
court.
U.S.C.A.
Const .Amend. 1.
[8] Constitutional Law 92 €^2206
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression
92k2203 Sexually Oriented Businesses;
Adult Businesses or Entertainment
92k2206 k. Nudity in General. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(3))
Constitutional Law 92 €^>2213
92 Constitutional Law
92XVIII Freedom of Speech, Expression, and
Press
92XVIII(Y) Sexual Expression
92k2203 Sexually Oriented Businesses;
Adult Businesses or Entertainment
92k2213 k. Secondary Effects. Most
Cited Cases
(Formerly 92k90.4(3))
Public Amusement and Entertainment 315T€^>

9(2)
315T Public Amusement and Entertainment
315TI In General
315Tk4
Constitutional,
Statutory
and
Regulatory Provisions
315Tk9 Sexually Oriented Entertainment
315Tk9(2) k. Dancing and Other
Performances. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 376k3 Theaters and Shows)
City ordinance prohibiting nudity in any
sexually-oriented business was constitutional under
First Amendment, notwithstanding contention of
nude outcall dancer that ordinance was not
content-neutral and that his expressive activity was
entitled to more protection because it occurred
primarily in private homes; ordinance was within
city's governmental powers to protect public health
and safety, furthered important governmental
interests in addressing secondary effects related to
public nudity, including prostitution, exposure to
minors, and obscenity, ordinance was aimed at
regulating secondary effects of nude expression,
and not expression itself or its primary effects, and
restriction was not greater than necessary to further
government interest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 1.
*439 On Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
Before BOGGS and GUY, Circuit Judges, and
CARR, District Judge.FN*

FN* The Honorable James G. Carr. United
States District Judge for the Northern
District of Ohio, sitting by designation.

OPINION
**1 Plaintiff-appellant
Greyson Currence
appeals the grant of summary judgment to the
defendant, the City of Cincinnati, on Currence's
claim for a violation of his First Amendment rights.
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For the following reasons, we
judgment of the district court.

AFFIRM

the

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Currence is a male out-call dancer who owns
and operates an exotic dance business. Currence
provides nude, exotic dancing services in homes or
hotel rooms for paying customers. (J.A. at 156,
163-64). He challenges Cincinnati Municipal
Ordinance No. 230-1996, codified at Chapter 899
of the Municipal Code. This ordinance requires
owners and employees of sexually-oriented
businesses to obtain a license from the City
Treasurer to operate or work for a sexually-oriented
business. CINCINNATI, OHIO, MUNICIPAL
CODE § 899-5. It also requires payment of an
application fee determined by the City Treasurer.
Id. at § 899-9. The application fee currently *440
is $250. (J.A. at 107). If the applicant is an
employee, the Treasurer will issue a temporary
permit so the applicant can work during review of
the application. Id. at § 899-5(C).
Section 899-7(A) requires the City to issue the
license within thirty days of receiving the
application unless: the applicant is under eighteen
years old; the applicant or applicant's spouse is
delinquent in paying taxes, fees, or fines; the
applicant or applicant's spouse has been convicted
of violating the regulation within the past two years;
the applicant supplied false or incomplete
information on the application; the applicant did
not pay the application fee; the applicant's
proposed location violated the city code; or the
applicant violated the Ohio Criminal Code during
specific time periods. Under § 899-13, the license
must be renewed annually.
If the City Treasurer decides not to issue the
license, he or she must notify the applicant under §
899-19(A). Section 899-19(A) gives the applicant
ten days to respond in writing. If the applicant
responds. § 899-19(A) requires the Treasurer to
hold a hearing within ten days of receiving the
written response. The applicant may, under §
€ 2008 Thomson/West. No

899-19(A), present witnesses and evidence at the
hearing. If the Treasurer does not make a
determination on the application after thirty days,
the Treasurer must, under § 899-19(A), issue a
temporary license. The temporary license remains
effective, under § 899-19(A), until the later of a
final decision, expiration of any time for appealing
a final decision, or entry of judgment on an appeal
by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Section 899-19(B) provides that, once the
Treasurer makes a final denial, the applicant may
appeal under Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised
Code. After the applicant files an appeal, the
Treasurer must, under § 899-19(B). issue a
temporary license, which is effective until a final
judgment is entered by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Section 899-22 prohibits nudity in any sexually
oriented business. That section states, "Nudity is
prohibited in any sexually oriented business
including said business where no alcoholic
beverages are sold, served or consumed, regardless
of whether a permit has been issued pursuant to this
Chapter 899."

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
**2 In district court, Currence asserted federal
and state-based challenges to the ordinance: 1) the
licensing requirement was a prior restraint on First
Amendment
protected
expression;
2)
the
application fee was an unconstitutional tax on
protected expression; 3) the ban on nudity was
intended to prevent expressive activity from
occurring at all; and 4) the licensing ordinance was
vague because it lacks standards for determining
whether the license must be granted, the process for
appeal, and whether outcall dancing can take place.
(J.A. at 126, 136, 139, & 142). Both Currence and
the City moved for summary judgment. (Id. at 115).
The district court granted the City's motion for
summary judgment and denied Currence's motion
for summary judgment. (Id. at 145). The district
lm to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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court found that Currence had standing to challenge
the license requirement, application fee, and nudity
ban. (Id. at 123). The district court subsequently
found that the license requirement, application fee,
and nudity ban passed First Amendment scrutiny. (
Id. at 136, 138, 141). Having decided the federal
constitutional claims, the district court declined to
exercise jurisdiction over the state-based claims and
dismissed them. (Id. at 144-45).
*441 Both parties challenge the district court's
ruling. The City contends the district court erred
by finding Currence had standing to bring a suit for
a First Amendment violation. Currence contends
the district court erred by ruling that the license
scheme and nudity ban did not violate the First
Amendment.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a grant of a motion for
summary judgment de novo. Smith v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 167 F.3d 286, 289 (6th Cir.1999).
Summary judgment will be affirmed if a review of
all the evidence in the record, in a light most
favorable to the party opposing summary judgment,
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact entitling the moving party to judgment
as a matter of law. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). If the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return
a verdict for the nonmoving party, a genuine issue
of material fact exists. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 9\ L.Ed.2d
202(1986).

DISCUSSION

I. Ripeness

The City argues that Currence does not have

standing to assert a facial challenge to the licensing
ordinance because his claim is not ripe. The City
argues that Currence neither applied for nor was
denied a license. Currence claims he was denied a
license. (First Br. of PI.-Appellant at 4).
[1][2] This is a factual dispute that was not
considered by the district court. Ripeness may,
however, be raised for the first time on appeal. In re
Cool Fuel, Inc. v. Board of Equalization of the
State of Cal, 210 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir.2000)
(citing Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43,
58 n. 18, 113 S.Ct. 2485, 125 L.Ed.2d 38 (1993)).
If Currence was denied a license, his claim
clearly is ripe. If Currence was not denied a
license, he is making a facial challenge, which
presents ripeness concerns.
**3 "The ripeness doctrine exists to ensure that
courts
decide
'only
existing,
substantial
controversies, not hypothetical questions or
possibilities.' " Dixie Fuel Co. v. Commissioner oj
Soc. Sec, 171 F.3d 1052, 1057 (6th Cir.1999)
(quoting City Communications, Inc. v. City oj
Detroit, 888 F.2d 1081, 1089 (6th Cir.1989)). It
centers on whether the facts are developed
sufficiently to permit determination. Hallandale
Prof. Fire Fighters v. City of Hallandale, 922 F.2d
756, 760 (11th Cir.1991).
A ripeness inquiry requires consideration of:
1) the likelihood that the injury alleged by Currence
will ever occur; 2) whether the issues are fit for
judicial determination; and 3) the hardship to the
parties from refusing consideration. Adult Video
Ass'n v. United States Dept. of Justice, 71 F.3d 563,
568 (6th Cir. 1995).
A case, generally, is more ripe if it involves
questions of law and few contingent future events.
New Mexicans for Bill Richardson v. Gonzales, 64
F.3d 1495, 1499 (10th Cir.1995). Ripeness
analysis is relaxed for First Amendment cases
involving a facial challenge to a regulation because
courts see a need to prevent the chilling of
expressive activity. Id. at 1500.
Currence

passes

the
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ripeness. It is likely that an injury will occur.
While it is possible Currence would be able to gain
a license, the City, which closely has monitored and
disapproves of Currence's activities, has given no
evidence of an inclination to grant a license.
Because nudity is a major component of Currence's
dance routine, the nudity ban, *442 moreover,
would injure Currence's ability to conduct his
activities. It, therefore, appears that an injury to
Currence is likely.
The issues are ready for judicial determination.
While there is disagreement over whether Currence
was denied a license, the case turns on issues of
law, because the central dispute is whether the
regulation violates the First Amendment. See id. at
1499; see also Amelkin v. McCJure, No. 94-6161,
1996 WL 8112, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 1414, at
*15 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 1996) ("[T]his case turns
largely on matters of law and not on contingent
matters of fact; at the heart of this controversy is
whether § 189.635(6) violates the First Amendment.

Withholding judicial relief may impose an
undue hardship on Currence. The hardship issue
centers on whether the City's action threatens " 'a
direct and immediate' " harm. El Dia, Inc. v.
Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d 488, 496 (1st Cir. 1992)
(citation omitted). Currence faces a direct and
immediate dilemma in how to conduct his dance
routine within the boundaries of the law.
Admittedly, this court has stated, "the caution and
uncertainty caused by withholding judicial relief at
this time is not an 'undue hardship.' Individuals
who choose to conduct their affairs along the
boundaries of the criminal law will necessarily incur
some risks concerning the legality of their conduct."
Adult Video Ass'n, 71 F.3d at 568 (citing Polykofj
v. Collins, 816 F.2d 1326, 1340 (9th Cir. 1987)). It
appears, however, at least with the respect to the
nudity ban, that the hardship is not uncertain.
**4 Especially in light of relaxed ripeness
standards for First Amendment facial challenges,
this case is ripe for judicial review.

II. Standing

Standing requires: 1) an injury in fact suffered
by the plaintiff; 2) a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of; and 3) the
likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a
decision in plaintiffs favor. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112
S.Ct.2130, 119L.Ed.2d351 (1992).
[3] The district court interpreted the City's
standing argument to center on the first
requirement-an injury in fact. The district court
stated that the City essentially argued that Currence
could not suffer a First Amendment injury if his
activities were not protected by the First
Amendment. (J.A. at 119). To be protected by the
First Amendment, one's conduct must constitute
expression. But the First Amendment does not
protect all expression. Currence's conduct must
constitute a type of expression protected by the First
Amendment for him to have standing.FN1

FN1. The City argues that this court should
deny standing for prudential reasons. The
City argues that it would be wise for this
court to exercise judicial self-restraint
under Natural Resources Defense Council
v. Jamison, 787 F.Supp. 231, 235
(D.D.C.1990), because Currence is using
the judiciary to facilitate the sale of
personal,
totally
nude
homosexual
interactive conduct.
The court m Jamison states:
As to the prudential limits on the court's
exercise of its jurisdiction, which may require a
denial of standing "if as a matter of judicial
self-restraint it seems wise not to entertain the case,"
... plaintiff "must plausibly ... assert that the injury
is arguably within the zone of interests protected or
regulated by the law on which the complaint is
founded." ..."Essentially, the standing question in
such cases is whether the constitutional or statutory
provision on which the claims rest can properly be
understood as granting persons in the plaintiffs
position a right to judicial relief."
Id. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500,
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95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Action
Alliance of Senior Citizens of Greater Philadelphia
v. Heckler, 789 F.2d 931, 936 (D.C.Cir.1986); 13
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE
AND
PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION 2D § 3531).
The City's argument is not well-taken. The
City cites no Sixth Circuit precedent applying these
prudential concerns to deny standing. The City
quotes one portion of Young v. Klutznick, 652 F.2d
617, 623 (6th Cir.1981), which simply states that "
courts have developed rules to limit their exercise
of jurisdiction in particular cases when prudential
considerations militate against invocation of the
judicial process." The City provides no statements
addressing the standard stated in Jamison.
It seems clear, furthermore, that the claimed
injury is within the zone of interests regulated by
the law challenged in the complaint. Currence's
business, the sale of erotic dancing performances, is
regulated by the law because the law imposes
certain restrictions or duties on Currence. We
decline, accordingly, to forego consideration of the
merits on the basis of prudential reasons.
*443 A. Whether Currence's Conduct Constitutes
Expression
[4] The City argues, as it contended before the
district court, that Currence's "sales were cnot
expressive conduct protected by the First
Amendment but rather are unprotected recreational,
sexual escort services.' " (Appellee Br. at 13
(citing City's Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. at
12)). In this court, the City claims that Currence
engages
in
non-expressive
sexually-oriented
conduct.
The district court stated, "The City does not
appear to argue that Plaintiffs activity is merely
non-expressive conduct. Rather, the City's choice
of words suggests that it believes that Plaintiff
engages in obscenity." (J.A. at 121). By only
discussing whether Currence's conduct constituted
obscenity-a type of expression not protected by the
First Amendment-the district court did not address
the initial issue of whether Currence's activity

involves expression under the First Amendment.
This court has held that the issue of whether
erotic
dancing
constitutes
expression
is
fact-specific. DLS. Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107
F.3d 403, 409 (6th Cir.1997) ("We consider it
appropriate to determine whether speech is
implicated on a case-by-case basis as a question of
fact, given the broad range of activities that may be
governed by this ordinance or laws similar to it.").
In his concurrence to Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,
501 U.S. 560, 581, 111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d
504 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring), Justice Souter
stated that, while not all dancing is expressive, a
dance performed by a nude or nearly so dancer
carries the message and expressive content of
eroticism unless shown otherwise. The Supreme
Court subsequently has stated that erotic, nude
dancing is expression, at least in a public place.
City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289, 120
S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000).
The record, including a police surveillance
tape, shows that Currence engages in nude dancing.
Based on Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court
precedent and Justice Souter's concurrence,
Currence's activity is expressive for First
Amendment purposes.

B. Whether Currence's Conduct is Expression
Protected by the First Amendment
**5 [5] The City alternatively argues that
Currence sells sexually-oriented expressive conduct
that is not protected by the First Amendment. The
City contends that the district court incorrectly
redefined the City's argument. The City argues that
it did not contend, before the district court, that
Currence engaged in obscenity.FN2 The *444 City
contends that it argued Currence engaged in
unprotected recreational, sexual escort services.
The district court, therefore, did not address the
argument presented to this court.

FN2. The district court characterized the
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City's argument as stating the City believed
Currence engaged in obscenity. (J.A. at
121). The district court subsequently held
that Currence's activities were not obscene.
(Id. at 123) (citing Sable Communications
v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct.
2829, 106L.Ed.2d93(1989)).
The City classifies Currence's activities as
personal
sexually-oriented
recreational
escort
services and outcall exotic dance. The City argues.
"If both recreational dancing and personal escort
services are not protected by the First Amendment,
personal
sexually-oriented
recreational
escort
services such as outcall exotic dance are also not
protected by the First Amendment." (Final Br. of
Def-Appellee at 17).
As noted, the Supreme Court has held that
nude, sexually-oriented dancing is protected under
the First Amendment. City of Erie, supra, 529 U.S.
at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382 ("[N]ude dancing of the type
at issue here is expressive conduct, although we
think that it falls only within the outer ambit of the
First Amendment's protection.") (citing Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66, 111 S.Ct.
2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504 (1991); Schad v. Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 68
L.Ed.2d671 (1981)).
The City distinguishes the instant case from
City of Erie on the basis that Currence's activity
occurs in private settings, rather than in public
places. Because the activity occurs in private, the
City argues Currence's services are of the escort
nature and fall outside the First Amendment. The
City calls attention to Judge Posner's concurrence in
Miller v. City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1101
(7th Cir.1990) (Posner, J., concurring), in which he
suggested that the smaller the audience for an erotic
dance, the less the First Amendment protection for
the performance. Id.
[6] Because the Supreme Court has not
distinguished between erotic dancing before private
or public audiences, we apply the general rule set
forth in City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct.
1382, and hold that erotic dancing is expression
protected by the First Amendment. Currence thus

has standing to challenge the ordinance because his
nude dancing performances constitute expression
protected by the First Amendment.

III. Constitutionality of the Ordinance

A. Licensing Scheme

[7] Currence argues that the licensing scheme
unlawfully imposes a prior restraint on First
Amendment expression. Currence contends that
the licensing scheme impermissibly restricts speech
on the basis of content and the speaker's identity
and is, therefore, not content-neutral. Currence
argues that, because the licensing scheme requires
only sexually-oriented businesses and their
employees, rather than all businesses and
employees, to obtain licenses, the scheme is an
unconstitutional prior restraint.
The City contends that, as a general
proposition, adult sexually-oriented businesses may
be
regulated.
The
City
argues
that
sexually-oriented conduct in private places creates a
propensity
for
prostitution,
obscenity,
and
transmission of disease, as well as a heightened risk
that minors will be exposed to these conditions.
The City argues it has a compelling interest in
preventing these conditions and risks, so that its
ordinance does not impose an unlawful prior
restraint on freedom of expression.
**6 In Nightclubs, Inc. v. City of Paducah, 202
F.3d 884 (6th Cir.2000), this court *445 stated the
standard for analyzing whether an ordinance is a
constitutionally invalid prior restraint. The court
stated:
Thus, a licensing scheme must remove
standardless discretion from government officials
and contain two procedural safeguards: (1) the
decision whether to issue a license must be made
within a specified brief period, and the status quo
must be maintained during that period and during
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judicial review, and (2) there must be a "guarantee
of prompt judicial review."
Id. at 890 (citing East Brooks Books, Inc. v.
City of Memphis, 48 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir.1995)).
The Cincinnati ordinance does not vest unbridled
discretion in government officials. The Treasurer
must issue a license if the applicant meets all of the
specified criteria, which are objective in character.
As the district court stated, there is no "room for
value judgments in determining whether or not to
issue the license." (J.A. at 129).
The decision whether to issue a license is to be
made within a specified and brief period of time.
The status quo is maintained during that period and
while judicial review, if any, occurs. The
Treasurer must issue the license within thirty days,
and unlike the ordinance in Nightclubs, an applicant
is not required to pass health and fire inspections as
a condition precedent to being licensed.
The applicant must, under § 899-7(A), obtain a
certificate of compliance under the zoning code.
The zoning code, however, requires issuance of a
compliance certificate within ten days of filing. If
zoning requirements are not met, the business may
operate during the pendency of an appeal.FN3 As
the district court determined, the maximum period
of delay resulting from the zoning requirements,
under Cincinnati Municipal Code § 1477-421,
would be seven to ten days for the initial zoning
determination, thirty days for a final decision from
the Zoning Board of Appeals, and then thirty days
from the filing of a notice of appeal.
FN3. The City conceded, before the
district court, that the zoning requirements
did not apply to Currence because he
operated his business from his home. The
district court held, however, that even if
the zoning conditions applied to Currence,
unreasonable delay would not result.
Because the filing of a notice of appeal permits
operation, the district court read the zoning and
licensing ordinances together to mean that a copy of
the notice of appeal satisfies the certificate of

compliance requirement under the licensing
ordinance. (J.A. at 133). The applicant would thus
have to wait a maximum of seventy days to begin
operation when considering the zoning and
licensing ordinances together because it could take
a maximum of forty days to obtain a zoning
certificate of compliance or notice of appeal and a
maximum of thirty days to obtain a permanent or
temporary license. (J.A. at 132-33).
Because it appears that a period of at least
seventy-four days constitutes a reasonable amount
of time to begin operation, the City's licensing
scheme passes the first prong of a prior restraint
analysis. See East Brooks Books, 48 F.3d at 225
(discussing
United
States
v.
Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 91 S.Ct. 1400, 28
L.Ed.2d 822 (1971)).
**7 The licensing scheme also provides for
prompt judicial review. The court, in Nightclubs,
acknowledged that this is a difficult task for cities
because they cannot control judicial dockets.
Nightclubs, 202 F.3d at 893. To alleviate this
problem, the court suggested that a city enact an
ordinance that: 1) requires a license to issue if the
court does not decide the issue within *446 a
certain period of time; or 2) issues a provisional
license to businesses or employees who seek
judicial review. Id. at 894 (citations omitted). The
City's ordinance does the latter-it issues a license
pending judgment by a court.
The licensing ordinance, thus, passes the prior
restraint analysis set forth in Nightclubs.FN4
FN4. Currence challenged the application
fee as an unconstitutional tax before the
lower court. Currence also challenged the
licensing scheme as vague before the
district court. Currence makes no mention
of these arguments on appeal.

B. Nudity Ban

[8] Currence argues that the nudity ban is not
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content-neutral because the purpose of the
ordinance is to prevent expressive activity from
occurring at all. Currence also argues that his
expressive activity is entitled to more protection
because it occurs primarily in homes. Currence
finally argues that the district court misapplied City
of Erie, supra. Currence contends the Supreme
Court concluded that requiring dancers to remain
minimally clothed only had a de minimis effect on
expression.
The City argues that the ban does not target
expression. The City contends that the Supreme
Court has held that the right to sell
sexually-oriented services, while nude, does not
override the government interests in controlling
adverse secondary effects.
In City of Erie, the Supreme Court discussed
the framework for analyzing ordinances addressing
public nudity. The Court stated that a more
stringent level of scrutiny applies when the
ordinance is related to the suppression of
expression. 529 U.S. at 289, 120 S.Ct. 1382.
When the regulation is not related to suppressing
expression, the regulation must satisfy the less
stringent standard set forth in United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 20 L.Ed.2d
672(1968).
Here, the ordinance appears to be unrelated to
the suppression of expression. The ordinance
expresses reasonable concerns about the secondary
effects of sexually-oriented business such as:
deleterious effect on surrounding businesses and
residential areas, increased crime, diminution of
property values, connection to unlawful sexual
activities, increased unhealthful conduct, sexual
transmission of disease, and harmful effects to
children. (J.A. at 66-67). Similar to the ordinance
at issue in City of Erie, this ordinance "does not
attempt to regulate the primary effects of the
expression, i.e., the effect on the audience of
watching nude erotic dancing, but rather the
secondary effects, such as the impacts on public
health, safety, and welfare...." 529 U.S. at 292, 120
S.Ct. 1382.
Under O'Brien, the ordinance must: 1) be

within the constitutional power of the city to enact;
2) further an important or substantial government
interest; 3) be unrelated to the suppression of
expression; and 4) establish a restriction that is no
greater than is necessary to further the government
interest. Id. at 296-301,120 S.Ct. 1382. The
district court did not discuss all four prongs but,
instead, focused on whether extending the
ordinance's nudity proscription is overly restrictive.
**8 The ordinance is within the City's
governmental power because the protection of
health and safety are within a government's police
powers. Id. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 ("Here, Erie's
efforts to protect public health and safety are clearly
within the city's police powers."). Important
governmental interests are at stake, namely:
controlling adverse secondary effects related to
public nudity such as prostitution, obscenity,*447
transmission of disease, and danger to minors.
These interests were endorsed in City of Erie. Id. ("
The asserted interests of regulating conduct through
a public nudity ban and of combating the harmful
secondary effects associated with nude dancing are
undeniably important.").
To demonstrate that the asserted secondary
effects are a threat, "the city need not wconduct new
studies or produce evidence independent of that
already generated by other cities' ....'so long as
whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably
believed to be relevant to the problem that the city
addresses.' " Id. (quoting Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925,
89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986)). The City relied on reviews
of the secondary effects of sexually-oriented
businesses in thirteen other cities. (J.A. at 66).
The City thus demonstrated that the asserted
secondary effects properly are subject to legislative
deterrence.
The City's ordinance furthers its legitimate
governmental interests. As the Court stated in City
of Erie,"[I]t is evident that, since crime and other
public health and safety problems are caused by the
presence of nude dancing establishments ..., a ban
on such nude dancing would further [the] interest m
preventing such secondary effects." Id. at 300-01,
120 S.Ct. 1382.
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The ordinance also is unrelated to the
suppression of expression. The ordinance aims to
regulate the secondary effects of the expression, not
the expression or its primary effects such as "the
effect on the audience of watching nude erotic
dancing." A/, at 291, 120 S.Ct. 1382.

END OF DOCUMENT

The district court only expressed concern with
the fourth element of O'Brien:
Not all of the identifiable secondary effects of
sexually oriented businesses are implicated by nude
outcall dancing. For instance, the Court doubts
seriously that nude outcall dancing to private homes
would ever have a deleterious effect on
neighborhood property values or cause urban blight.
On the other hand, opportunities to engage in
prostitution are certainly increased in this setting as
are the chances that minors will be exposed to this
activity.
(J.A. at 140-41).
The court ultimately concluded that the City's
interest only was diminished slightly and O'Brien
was satisfied.
The district court's rationale was correct.
Certain secondary effects remain a concern with
outcall services, such as: prostitution, exposure to
minors, and obscenity. The City has an important
interest in preventing such effects, and the nudity
ban furthers this interest. The City has not
established a restriction that is greater than is
necessary to further the government interest. The
nudity ban is constitutional under the First
Amendment.

CONCLUSION
**9 For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
C.A.6 (Ohio),2002.
Currence v. City of Cincinnati
28 Fed.Appx. 438, 2002 WL 104778 (C.A.6 (Ohio))
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BACKGROUND
Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Cook
Ill.App. 1 Dist.,2007.
Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR
WITHDRAWAL.
Appellate Court of Illinois,First District.
POOH-BAH ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a Crazy
Horse Too, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
The COUNTY OF COOK; Barbara Bruno, Director
of the Cook County Department of Revenue; and
The City of Chicago, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 1-05-2924.
Dec. 21,2007.

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County,
Alexander P. White, Judge Presiding.
Justice O'MARA FROSSARD delivered the
opinion of the court:
*1 Plaintiff Pooh-Bah Enterprises, Inc., appeals
the orders that granted the motions to dismiss filed
by defendants the County of Cook and the director
of its department of revenue (the County), and the
City of Chicago (the City). Plaintiffs dismissed
action sought declaratory and injunctive relief
against defendants, challenging the constitutionality
of their amusement tax exemptions for small, fine
arts venues that exclude adult entertainment cabaret
s. On appeal plaintiff contends that the tax
exemption scheme: (1) violates the first amendment
of the United States Constitution; (2) violates the
free speech clause o f the Illinois Constitution; (3) is
overbroad; (4) is vague: and (5) violates the
uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution. For
the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of
the circuit court.

The City imposes on patrons of any amusement
a tax of 8% on the admission price to enter, witness,
view, or participate in any amusement within its
boundaries.
Chicago
Municipal
Code
§
4-156-020(A) (amended December 15, 2004). The
County imposes a virtually identical tax at a rate of
3%. Cook County Amusement Tax Ordinance, § 3
(eff April 1, 1999).
The City defines amusement as:
"any exhibition, performance, presentation or
show for entertainment puiposes, * * * including,
but not limited to, any theatrical, dramatic, musical
or spectacular performance, promotional show,
motion picture show, flower, poultry or animal
show, animal act, circus, rodeo, athletic contest,
sport, game or similar exhibition [or] * * * any paid
television programming."Chicago Municipal Code §
4-156-010(2006).
The County's definition of amusement is
similar. Cook County Amusement Tax Ordinance, §
2 (eff. April 1, 1999).
Effective January 1999, the City and County
amended their amusement tax ordinances, with the
intent to foster the production of live performances
that offer theatrical, musical or cultural enrichment.
See City Council Journal Entry, November 12,
1998, amending § 4-156-020(D); Cook County
Board of Commissioner's Resolution, November 17,
1998, amending the amusement tax ordinance.
Specifically, the City and County exempted from
the amusement tax live theatrical, live musical or
other live cultural performances that take place in a
space with a maximum capacity of not more than
750
people
(hereinafter.
the
small-venue
exemption).
Chicago
Municipal
Code
§
4-156-020(D)(l) (2006); Cook County Amusement
Tax Ordinance, § 3D(1) (eff. April 1, 1999). To
clarify the exemption, amendments were passed in
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April 1999 defining live theatrical, live musical or
other live cultural performance as:
"a live performance in any of the disciplines
which are commonly regarded as part of the fine
arts, such as live theater, music, opera, drama,
comedy, ballet, modern or traditional dance, and
book or poetry readings. The term does not include
such amusements as athletic events, races or
performances conducted at adult entertainment
cabarets [as defined by local ordinance]." Chicago
Municipal Code § 4-156-010 (amended April 21,
1999); Cook County Amusement Tax Ordinance, §
2(eff.Aprill, 1999).

*2 The following definitions are contained in
section 16-16-030 of the City's adult use ordinance:
" 'Adult entertainment cabaret' means a public
or private establishment which: (i) features topless
dancers, strippers, male or female impersonators;
(ii) not infrequently, features entertainers who
display 'specified anatomical areas'; or (iii) features
entertainers who by reason of their appearance or
conduct perform in a manner which is designed
primarily to appeal to the prurient interest of the
patron or entertainers who engage in, or engage in
the explicit simulation of, 'specified sexual
activities.'
'Specified sexual activities' means and is
defined as:
1. Human genitals in a state of sexual
stimulation or arousal;
2. Acts o f human masturbation, sexual
intercourse or so do my;
3. Fondling or other erotic touching of human
genitals, public region, buttock or female breast.
'Specified anatomical areas' means and is
defined as:
1. Less than completely and opaquely covered:
(a) human genitals, pubic region, (b) buttock and (c)
female breast below a point immediately above the
top of the areola; and
2. Human male genitals m a discemibly turgid
state, even if completely and opaquely covered."
Chicago Municipal Code § 16-16-030 (2006).
Similar definitions of these same three terms
are contained in the County's zoning ordinance.
Cook County Zoning Ordinance of 2001, art. 14.2.1

(2006).
In 2001, plaintiff filed this action for
declaratory and injunctive relief against the County.
Plaintiff operates an adult entertainment cabaret in
Chicago under the name Crazy Horse Too, which
has a maximum capacity of less than 750 persons.
Crazy Horse Too features live performances of
exotic dancing by scantily clad women, who, during
their dances, become semi-clothed in that they
remove much of their clothing and display certain
specified anatomical areas. Plaintiffs complaint
challenged the provision of the small-venue
exemption that excludes performances conducted at
adult entertainment cabarets. Plaintiff argued the
exclusion violates the first amendment of the United
States Constitution and the free speech clause o f
the Illinois Constitution. The City filed a motion to
intervene as a party defendant because its
amusement tax and small-venue exemption are
similar to the County's. The circuit court granted the
motion.
Plaintiff filed a second amended complaint,
adding first amendment and free speech clause
claims against the City. According to the complaint,
after the small-venue exemptions were enacted,
plaintiff stopped adding the amusement tax to the
admission fee it charged and began paying the tax
itself under protest. Plaintiff sought a refund of
those taxes, arguing that the small-venue
exemptions' exclusion of patrons of performances
conducted
at
adult
entertainment
cabarets
impermissibly discriminated on the basis of content,
facially and as applied, against exotic dancing and
other performances with adult content in violation
of the first amendment and the free speech clause.
Plaintiff also argued that the adult entertainment
cabaret exclusions were, facially and as applied,
overbroad and vague in violation of the first
amendment and free speech clause.
*3 The City and County moved to dismiss
plaintiffs claims under section 2-615 of the Code of
Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2002)),
for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted. The circuit court granted the motions to
dismiss, concluding that the exclusion of adult
entertainment cabarets from the small-venue
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exemptions did not violate the first amendment, that
the free speech clause of the Illinois Constitution
did not provide any greater protection in this type of
case, and that the tax exemption schemes were
neither overbroad nor vague. Plaintiff filed a motion
to reconsider, which was denied by the circuit court.
Plaintiff also filed a third amended complaint,
containing two claims under the uniformity clause
of the Illinois Constitution. The City then moved to
dismiss, and the County joined the motion. The
circuit court dismissed the new claims because it
found that real and substantial differences existed
between small, fine arts venues and adult
entertainment cabarets, that similar distinctions for
tax purposes have been upheld, and t hat the
differences bo re a reasonable relationship to the
small-venue exemption's purpose of enhancing the
City's and County's reputations in the fine arts.
Plaintiff then appealed.

ANALYSIS
The circuit court granted defendants' motions
to dismiss because plaintiff failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted. In ruling on such
a motion, the court considers all well-pleaded facts
and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Jackim v. CCLake, Inc.,
363 Ill.App.3d 759, 760-61 (2005). The only
question presented by a section 2-615 motion to
dismiss for failure to state a cause of action is
whether sufficient facts are stated in the complaint
which, if true, could entitle the plaintiff to relief.
Illinois Graphics Co. v. Nickum, 159 I11.2d 469,
488 (1994). Our review of a dismissal under section
2-615 is de novo. Jackim, 363 Ill.App.3d at 760.

First Amendment

The first amendment to the United States
Constitution, made applicable to the states through

the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, prohibits governmental action that
abridges freedom of speech. U.S. Const., amends. I,
XIV; People v. Alexander, 204 IU.2d 472, 476
(2003). First amendment protections are not limited
to the written or spoken word, but may also extend
to expressive conduct. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397, 404, 105 L.Ed.2d 342, 353, 109 S.Ct. 2533,
2539 (1989). While erotic dancing of the sort
practiced at Crazy Horse Too enjoys constitutional
protection as expressive conduct, it falls "only
within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's
protection."^ of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S.
277, 289, 146 L.Ed.2d 265, 278, 120 S.Ct. 1382,
1391 (2000).
Plaintiff raises both facial and as-applied
constitutional challenges to the provisions in
defendants' tax schemes that exclude adult
entertainment cabarets from the amusement tax
small-venue exemption. Plaintiff argues that the
provisions are content-based on their face and the
exclusion of performances conducted at adult
entertainment cabarets applies to plaintiffs small
venue by reference to the expressive activity
performed inside. A party raising a facial challenge
to a law bears the heavy burden of demonstrating
that it is unconstitutional under any set of
circumstances, whereas a party raising an as-applied
challenge need only show that, although the law
may be constitutionally
applied
in most
circumstances, it was specifically applied to him in
an unconstitutional manner. People v. Garvin, 219
I11.2dl04, 117(2006).
*4 "It is settled that speech can be effectively
limited by the exercise of the taxing power "Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460,
1468, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 1338 (1958), citing Grosjean
v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L.Ed. 660,
56 S.Ct. 444 (1936). Although it is constitutional to
tax first amendment activities in a genuinely
nondiscriminatory
fashion
{Arkansas Writers'
Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229, 95
L.Ed.2d 209, 219, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1727 (1987)).
the Supreme Court in Leathers v. Medlock, 499
U.S. 439, 113 L.Ed.2d 494, 111 S.Ct. 1438 (1991).
identified three situations where a tax imposed by
government will trigger strict scmtiny under the
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first amendment. Absent a compelling justification,
the government may not exercise its taxing power to
(1) single out the press, (2) target a small group of
speakers, or (3) discriminate on the basis of the
content of taxpayer speech. Leathers, 499 U.S. at
447, 113 L.Ed.2d at 503-04, 111 S.Ct. at 1443-44.
Strict scrutiny requires the government to show that
the law is both necessary to serve a compelling
interest and narrowly tailored to achieve that end.
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group. Inc.,
529 U .S. 803, 813, 146 L.Ed.2d 865, 879, 120
S.Ct. 1878, 1886(2000).

tax exemptions, holding that they are limited by the
first amendment. American Multi-Cinema, Inc. v.
City of Warrenville, 321 Ill.App.3d 349, 354 (2001)
(noting that a selective amusement tax on free
speech will trigger heightened scrutiny under the
first amendment if it discriminates on the basis of
content); Satellink of Chicago, Inc. v. City oj
Chicago, 168 Ill.App.3d 689, 696 (1988)
(amusement
tax
amendment
that
targeted
subscription television by exempting
cable
television would not withstand strict scrutiny
analysis).

In explaining the problematic nature of
differential taxation, the Supreme Court, in the
context of a discriminatory tax on a certain segment
of print media, stated that the general applicability
of any burdensome tax helps to ensure that it will be
met with widespread opposition. But when such a
law applies only to a single constituency, it is
insulated from political constraint. Minneapolis Star
c£ Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner oj
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585, 75 L.Ed.2d 295,
304-05, 103 S.Ct.
1365, 1371-72 (1983).
Speaker-based or content-based taxes, absent a
compelling government interest, will be struck
down as a form of censorship. Murdoch, v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105,
116, 87 L.Ed. 1292, 1300, 63 S.Ct. 870, 876 (1943)
("a community may not suppress, or the state tax,
the dissemination of views because they are
unpopular, annoying or distasteful"); Grosjean, 297
U.S. at 244, 80 L.Ed, at 666, 56 S.Ct. at 447 (a
gross receipts tax derived from advertisements
carried in newspapers operated as a restraint on
speech).

*5 The City's and County's amusement taxes
are taxes of general applicability, which apply to
sports, theaters, movies, paid television, circuses,
and numerous other forms of entertainment unless
specifically exempted. The taxes do not single out
the press for special treatment or target a small
group of speakers. However, the third circumstance
that triggers heightened scrutiny analysis under the
first amendment-that the tax discriminates on the
basis of the content of the speech-is an issue in this
case.

The Supreme Court has also recognized that
content-based tax exemptions operate to suppress
speech and implicate strict scrutiny. In Speiser, 357
U.S. at 518, 2 L.Ed.2d at 1468, 78 S.Ct. at 1338,
where the Court deemed unconstitutional a
California tax provision requiring veterans to sign a
loyalty oath in order to claim a property tax
exemption, the Court noted, "[i]t cannot be gainsaid
that a discriminatory denial of a tax exemption for
engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech."
Similarly, Illinois courts have recognized the
suppressive nature of selective taxes and selective
© 2008 Thomson/West. No CI;

Defendants argue that their amusement tax
schemes should be deemed content-neutral because
they were not enacted with the purpose of
discriminating against any particular expression.
According to defendants, the adult entertainment
cabaret exclusions were not enacted to suppress
protected expression but, rather, because that type
of venue does not further the legitimate
governmental policy of encouraging, through
subsidization, small-venue fine arts performances
that will enhance the City's and County's reputations
in the fine arts. Because those policy interests are
not related to the content of the message being
expressed, defendants contend, their tax schemes
should be considered content-neutral and, thus,
strict scrutiny should not apply.

Content-Neutral and Content-Based Regulations

A regulation is content-neutral so long as it is "
'justified without reference to the content of the
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regulated speech.' " Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L.Ed.2d 661, 675, 109 S.Ct.
2746, 2753 (1989), quoting Clark v. Community for
Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 82
L.Ed.2d 221, 227, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069 (1984).
Generally, laws that by their terms distinguish
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis
of the ideas or views expressed are content-based.
People v. Jones, 188 I11.2d 352, 358-60 (1999)
(statute that banned the emission of loud amplified
sound from vehicles but exempted advertising was
content-based and violated the first amendment).
Laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on
speech without reference to the ideas or views
expressed are in most instances content-neutral.
Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 643-44,
129 L.Ed.2d 497, 518-19, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2459-60
(1994) (strict scmtiny did not apply to requirement
that cable systems must carry full power local
broadcast stations because the provisions depended
only on the operator's channel capacity, not the
content of programming).
The first amendment does not generally
countenance governmental control over the content
of messages expressed by private individuals
because each person should decide for himself or
herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of
expression, consideration, and adherence. Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc., 512 U.S. at 641, 129
L.Ed.2d at 517, 114 S.Ct. at 2458. Thus,
content-based regulations are presumptively invalid
(R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 U.S.
377, 382, 120 L.Ed.2d 305, 317, 112 S.Ct. 2538,
2542 (1992)) and will be upheld only if necessary
to serve a compelling governmental interest and
narrowly drawn to achieve that end (Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270, 70 L.Ed.2d 440,
447-48, 102 S.Ct 269, 274 (1981)).
*6 Although the government's purpose is the
controlling consideration in determining content
neutrality, the mere assertion of a content-neutral
purpose will not save a law "which, on its face,
discriminates
based
on
content "Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc., 512 U.S. at 642-43, 129
L.Ed.2d at 518, 114 S.Ct. at 2459. See also Jones,
188 I11.2d at 361-62. The fact that defendants'

small-venue exemptions may have been intended to
serve content-neutral goals is not dispositive. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that " '[ijllicit
legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a
violation of the First Amendment.' " Simon &
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State
Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 117, 116
L.Ed.2d 476, 488, 112 S.Ct. 501, 509 (1991),
quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 460 U.S.
at 592, 75 L.Ed.2d at 309, 103 S.Ct. at 1376. We
therefore reject defendants' contention that the
existence of a content-neutral purpose renders the
tax ordinances at issue here content-neutral.
The language of the definitions from the City's
adult use ordinance and the County's zoning
ordinance, which were incorporated into the City's
and County's respective small-venue exemptions,
establishes that the adult entertainment cabaret
exclusions, on their face, discriminate based on
content. Specifically, the definitions in the
amusement tax ordinances of live theatrical, live
musical or other live cultural performance
(Chicago Municipal Code § 4-156-010 (2006);
Cook Count y Amusement Tax Ordinance, § 2 (eff.
April 1,1999)) reference the definition of adult
entertainment cabaret contained within the City's
adult use ordinance or the County's zoning
ordinance (Chicago Municipal Code § 16-16-030
(2005); Cook County Zoning Ordinance of 2001,
Art. 14.2.1 (2006)). Both the City's adult use
ordinance and the County's zoning ordinance define
an adult entertainment cabaret by the content of the
expression featured at the establishment, e.g.,
topless dancing, stripping, entertainers who display
specified anatomical areas (excessive breast or
buttocks skin exposure), etc. Chicago Municipal
Code § 16-16-030 (2005); Cook County Zoning
Ordinance
of
2001,
art.
14.2.1
(2006).
Consequently, read together, the operative language
of those ordinances excludes from the amusement
tax small-venue exemption those amusements that
are defined, inso far as applied t o plaintiff, by
semi-naked erotic performance art or expression.
One cannot determine whether the operative criteria
of the adult entertainment cabaret exclusions apply
to a particular small venue without considering the
content of the small venue's featured speech or
expressive conduct.

© 2008 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

N.E.2d

Page 6

— N.E.2d —-, 2007 WL 4526527 (Ul.App. 1 Dist.)
(Cite as: — N.E.2d — )
Defendants are not aided by their citation
to Leathers, where the Supreme Court found that an
Arkansas statute extending the generally applicable
sales tax to cable services (but not satellite
services), while maintaining existing exemptions for
magazines and newspapers, did not raise first
amendment concerns. Leathers, 499 U.S. at 453,
113 L.Ed.2d at 508, 111 S.Ct. at 1447. There, the
Court determined that the Arkansas sales tax was
not content-based because nothing in the statute
referred
to the content of mass media
communications. Moreover, cable television offered
subscribers a mixture of news, information, and
entertainment and there was no record evidence that
such material differed systematically in its message
from that communicated by satellite broadcast
programming, newspapers, or magazines. Leathers,
499^U.S. at 449, 113 L.Ed.2d at 505, 111 S.Ct. at
1445. Here, in contrast, defendants' adult
entertainment cabaret exclusions are content-based
and the content of the performances featured at such
cabarets differs systematically in its erotic message
from that communicated by the exempt fine arts
venues.

Compelling Interest
*7 Accordingly, because the differential tax on
erotic dance is a content-based regulation on
protected expression, it is presumptively invalid and
may be upheld only if it is necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and narrowly drawn to
achieve that end. Because defendants argued on
appeal, unsuccessfully, that their tax schemes were
content-neutral, they did not argue that their tax
schemes served a compelling state interest in order
to survive a first amendment strict scrutiny analysis.
Alternatively, defendants argue that their adult
entertainment cabaret exclusions do not prohibit or
restrict exotic dancing but, rather, are governmental
policy to encourage, through subsidization, the
production of innovative fine arts performances at
small venues in an effort to enhance the City's and
County's reputations in the fine arts. Defendants
contend that new and innovative shows have a

greater chance of being chosen for production on
Broadway or to tour nationally. Moreover, such
shows may have the added effect of drawing new
restaurants, shops and hotels to the surrounding
community. Defendants argue that the most efficient
way to subsidize small, fine arts venues is to give
their patrons an exemption from the amusement tax,
because it relieves small venues of the
administrative and financial burdens that flow from
having to collect the tax from patrons and remit it to
the City and County at specified times.
Defendants argue that state action that
interferes is different from state action that
encourages an alternative activity based on public
policy.
Citing
Regan
v.
Taxation
With
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 76
L.Ed.2d 129, 103 S.Ct. 1997 (1983), Rust v.
Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 114 L.Ed.2d 233, 111 S.Ct.
1759 (1991), and National Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 141 L.Ed.2d 500, 118 S.Ct.
2168 (1998), defendants argue that their tax
schemes are consistent with Supreme Court rulings
that allow the government to selectively fund a
program to encourage certain activities it believes
to be in the public interest without at the same time
funding an alternative program. We disagree.
Regan, Rust, and Finley do not establish that the
government can encourage one private speaker over
another based on content or message without
implicating first amendment concerns.
Regan held that an internal revenue statute that
prohibited tax exempt charitable organizations from
using tax-deductible contributions to support their
lobbying efforts did not violate the first amendment,
which did not require Congress to subsidize
lobbying. Regan, 461 U.S. at 546, 76 L.Ed.2d at
137, 103 S.Ct. at 2001. Furthermore, the statute did
not violate the equal protection component of the
fifth amendment, because it was rational for
Congress to decide that, even though it would not
subsidize
substantial
lobbying by
charities
generally, it would subsidize lobbying by veterans'
organizations given our country's long-standing
policy of compensating veterans for their past
contributions by providing them with numerous
advantages./tegtf/?, 461 U.S. at 550-51, 76 L.Ed.2d
at 140, 103 S.Ct. at 2003-04.
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*8 Unlike the tax ordinances before us,
Congress in Regan did not discriminate invidiously
in granting its exemptions, which were not aimed at
suppressing any ideas. Veterans' organizations were
entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions
regardless of the content of any speech they might
use, including lobbying. Congress could exempt
veterans' organizations from taxation differently
than it did charitable organizations as long as the
exemption was not content-based. Regan, 461 U.S.
at 548, 76 L.Ed.2d at 138, 103 S.Ct. at 2002. Regan
did not uphold, or even address, discrimination
between speech or expressive activities based on
content.
In Rust, 500 U.S. at 178-80, 114 L.Ed.2d at
246-47, 111 S.Ct. at 1764-66, regulations
prohibited recipients of federal funds appropriated
for family-planning services from engaging in
counseling concerning, referrals for, and activities
advocating abortion and required the recipients to
maintain
separate
facilities,
personnel
and
accounting records from any abortion activity.
Those regulations did not violate first amendment
free speech rights because the government did not
discriminate on the basis of viewpoint. The
government merely chose to fund one activity to the
exclusion of another, and the regulations simply
ensured that federal funds were not used for
activities, including speech, that were outside the
scope of the federal program. Rust, 500 U.S. at 193,
114 L.Ed.2d at 255, 111 S.Ct. at 1772. In contrast
to our case, Rust concerned the dissemination to the
public of a specific government message through a
focused government subsidy program that paid
organizations to distribute the government's
message. Rust did not involve encouraging selected
private speech by private citizens exercising their
first amendment rights. Rust, 500 U.S. at 199, 114
L.Ed.2d at 259, 111 S.Ct. at 1775.
Defendants' reliance on Rust is misplaced
because that case involved the government speech
doctrine rather than government regulation of
private speech. In accordance with the government
speech doctrine, when the government itself is
speaking or is paying a third party to speak to the
public on the government's behalf, the government's
message is not subject to first amendment
© 2008 Thomson/West. No CI:

restrictions. This doctrine follows from the simple
fact that the first amendment aims to protect
citizens' free speech from government interference.
Later, in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 132 L.Ed.2d
700, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995), the Court reiterated the
point that the constitutional regulation of speech
discussed in Rust did not apply to a
government-created program to encourage private
speech, but was limited to situations where the
government disbursed public finds to private
speakers to transmit specific information pertaining
to the government's own program. Rosenberger,
515 U.S. at 833, 132 L.Ed.2d at 718, 115 S.Ct. at
2519 (where student organizations were subsidized
by a state university but were not agents of the
university, the student organizations' subsidized
speech was private speech rather than government
speech and, thus, not exempt from first amendment
protection).
*9 In Finley, 524 U.S. at 581-83, 141 L.Ed.2d
at 512-13, 118 S.Ct. at 2175-76, the Court upheld a
grant program provision that implemented the
consideration of decency and respect standards
when determining which art projects would receive
government subsidies. The provision was facially
constitutional because it did not place conditions on
grants or preclude awards to projects that might be
deemed indecent or disrespectful. Finley, 524 U.S.
at 581-83, 141 L.Ed.2d at 512-13, 118 S.Ct. at
2175-77. Any content-based considerations taken
into account in the grant-making process were a
consequence of the nature of arts funding where the
government agency's mandate was to make aesthetic
judgments. Finley, 524 U.S. at 585-86, 141 L.Ed.2d
at 514-15, 118 S.Ct. at 2177-78. The Court,
however, reiterated that if the provision was applied
so as to discriminate based on " 'certain ideas or
viewpoints' " (i.e., in a content-based manner) or if
the decency or respect standards were an enforced
requirement, the provision would then be subject to
strict scrutiny review. Finlev, 524 U.S. at 587, 141
L.Ed.2d at 516, 118 S.Ct. at 2178-79, quoting
Simon & Schuster, Inc., 502 U.S. at 116, 116
L.Ed.2d at 487, 112 S.Ct. at 508. As discussed
above, defendants' adult entertainment cabaret
exclusions discriminate against protected speech
based on content.
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Regan, Rust, and Finley do not support
defendants' contention that affirmative government
policies encouraging selective private speech do not
implicate the first amendment and thereby escape
strict scrutiny analysis. Moreover, we find no
compelling state interest which necessitates the
content-based
adult
entertainment
cabaret
exclusions contained in defendants' amusement tax
schemes. Defendants argue that they have a
legitimate interest in enhancing Chicago's and Cook
County's reputations in the fine arts. We do not
disagree wit h this proposition; however, their
interests do no t rise to the level o f a compelling
stat e inter est that will justify, under the first
amendment, a content-based restriction on protected
expression. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co.,
460 U.S. at 586, 75 L.Ed.2d at 305, 103 S.Ct. at
1372 (raising revenue is not a compelling interest
sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny).

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, we hold that the City's and
County's adult entertainment cabaret exclusions
from the amusement tax small-venue exemptions
are content-based regulations on speech that do not
serve a compelling state interest and, therefore,
violate the first amendment. Given this holding, we
do not reach plaintiffs claims that the tax schemes
are unconstitutionally overbroad or vague or violate
the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution.
We reverse the orders of the trial court that granted
defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim and remand this cause for further proceedings.
Reversed and remanded.
FITZGERALD SMITH, P.J., and TULLY, J.,
concur.
Ill.App. 1 Dist.,2007.
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